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Abstract: Some countries may face choice between targeting inflation independently and 
entering a monetary union that targets inflation. This paper shows that the choice of a country 
in favour of monetary union may be motivated by asymmetrical supply shocks. The demand 
shocks are neutralised under these regimes and don’t explain the choice of joining a monetary 
union. Further, before or after the construction of the union, monetary authorities must keep a 
minimum concern for stabilising output around its potential in order to guarantee the dynamic 
stability of the economy in a framework where the central bank is assumed to be unable to 
perfectly control, through the manipulation of the repo interest rate, the interest rate at which 
the private financial and non-financial agents lend and borrow. The disappearance of national 
currencies can render the economy of the union unstable.  
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting has become explicitly or implicitly the principal framework for the 
conduct of monetary policy in many industrialised and emerging countries. Earlier researches 
have been focused on issues in closed economies. More and more attention is now being 
given to the studies of inflation targeting in open economies1.  
Most of the studies examine the inflation-targeting issues in small open economy. There 
are fewer studies of inflation targeting within a multi-country framework. Persson and 
Tabellini (1996), focusing on the relationship between the “ins” and the “outs” at Stage III of 
the EMU within a two-country framework, do not consider entering a monetary union that 
targets inflation as an alternative to independent inflation targeting.  
Canzoneri, Nolan, and Yates (1997) compare inflation targeting with the ERM in a two-
country model. They consider the case where one of the countries has low inflation and an 
optimal degree of stabilisation and the other country lacks the credibility to implement the 
optimal monetary policy rule. Their focus is on credibility of Central Bank rather than 
stabilisation of the economy.  
Roseland and Torvik (2003) go further in establishing a bridge between the inflation 
targeting and the optima currency area (OCA) literature. In their view, a monetary union that 
targets inflation is the most relevant alternative to independent inflation targeting for many 
countries. They extend the theory of OCA to deal with the choice for some countries between 
targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. In 
contrast to the conventional theory, countries might form more of an optimum currency area 
the more asymmetrical supply shocks are. They consider only the static comparatives of 
alternative monetary regimes. The dynamics of the economy is evacuated in setting the 
economy at stationary state and in assuming that the expected inflation rate is equal to the 
                                                 
1 See Rodseth (1996), Dueker and Fischer (1996), Ball (1998), Batini and Haldane (1999), Svensson (2000), 
Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), Berger, Jensen, and Schelderup (2001), 
Leitemo and Roisland (2003).  
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inflation target of the central bank whatever is the nature of the shocks (persistent or 
transitory).  
Benigno (2004), Benigno and López-Salido (2006) investigate in a two-region general 
equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness, the optimal conduct of 
monetary policy in a currency area characterised by asymmetric shocks across regions. They 
show that monetary policy should follow a particular inflation-targeting policy in which 
higher weight is given to the inflation rate in the region with higher degree of nominal 
rigidity.  
The present study extends that of Roseland and Torvik (2003) in giving a thorough 
dynamic treatment of independent inflation targeting and monetary union regimes while 
granting a role to the money markets that are neglected in the traditional inflation-targeting 
literature.2 In effect, by controlling the repo interest rate which is a rate at which the 
commercial banks can refinance at the central bank, the central bank cannot control directly 
and tenuously the interest rates at which financial and non-financial agents lend and borrow.  
In this respect, even if a part of money supply is entirely determined by the market 
participants to the money market, private agents will check the state of liquidity on the money 
market to find out if there is too much or too little liquidity, hence generating inflationary or 
deflationary pressure. In a context of financial crisis or boom, central banks will be more 
likely to intervene, by injecting or withdrawing the liquidity, on the money market to regulate 
the money market interest rate which may deviate from the repo interest rate. In this context, 
the private inflation expectations will be governed by a dynamics determined by all equations 
of the model rather than just by the Phillips curve, IS curve and the optimal interest rate rule. 
                                                 
2 According to King (2000), there are two conventional strategies to use LM in the literature relating to the 
interest rate rule. The first uses LM to specify money supply rules and to compare them with interest rate rules. 
The second uses interest rate rule to describe the monetary strategy, LM is used to determine the endogenous 
money supply. Romer (2000) proposes the teaching of macroeconomics without LM. Within a static framework 
of analysis adopting a interest rate rule, the absence of LM or money market has not any great inconvenience. 
The matter is different in a dynamic setting as shown by Dai and Sidiropoulos (2003) and this paper: the money 
markets described by LM can play the role of co-ordinating the inflation expectations of private agents.   
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The money market plays a central role as the coordination device for the formation of 
expectations about future variables (Dai and Sidiropoulos, 2003).  
Our paper shows that, whatever is the regime adopted, monetary authorities must not 
place too much weight on inflation target relative to output target for the economy to be 
dynamically stable. Some difficulty in stabilising the economy of monetary union may arise 
with the disappearance of nominal exchange rate between national currencies. Even the 
present model is more traditional and not micro-founded like that of Benigno (2004) and 
Benigno and López-Salido (2006), it gains in tractability and gives rise to interesting insights 
in the analysis of dynamic stability.  
Section 2 lays down the model. Section 3 studies the long-run effects of shocks under the 
two alternative monetary regimes. The dynamic stability of these regimes and the dynamic 
adjustment paths of different variables are examined in sections 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
Home country and foreign country are of the same size. Each country has specialised in 
producing a single good. Inflation in home country and foreign country (indexed by f) is 
respectively governed by an expectation-augmented Phillips curve: 
 π
∗ ε+−α+π=π )( yye ,              0>α ,           (1) 
ffffef yy π
∗ ε+−α+π=π )( .                           (2) 
where π  ( )dtdp /≡  and fπ  ( )dtdp f /≡  are respectively home and foreign inflation rates, 
eπ  and feπ  the expected inflation rates, y  and fy  the actual outputs, ∗y  and ∗fy  the 
natural levels of output and πε  and fπε  white noise inflationary (or supply) shocks. The 
aggregate demand in each country, which is equal to output, depends on the expected real 
interest rate, )( ei π−  or )( fefi π− , and the real exchange rate, s , as follows: 
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where i  and fi  are nominal interest rates, peps f −+≡ , with p denoting the domestic 
price level in home currency, fp  the foreign price level in foreign currency, e  the nominal 
exchange rate, and dε  and fdε  are white noise demand shocks.  
The foreign exchange market is characterised by uncovered interest rate parity adjusted 
for a stochastic risk premium shock eε , i.e., 
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with ee&  and es&  denoting respectively the expected rate of change of nominal and real 
exchange rates.  
The money market equilibrium are characterised by 
    milylpm ε+−=− 21 ,   0 , 21 >ll ,             (6) 
 fm
ffff ilylpm ε+−=− 21 ,                                                 (7) 
where m  and fm represent respectively home and foreign money supplies. mε  and fmε  are 
white noise shocks affecting respectively home and foreign money demands. The 
differentiation of (6)-(7) relative to time gives: 
milylpm ε+−=π−μ=− &&&&& 21 ,  0, 21 >ll .                          (6’) 
f
m
ffffff ilylpm ε+−=π−μ=− &&&&& 21 .                           (7’) 
where μ== dtdmm /&  and fff dtdmm μ== /& are respectively home and foreign money 
supply growth rates. It is assumed that 0=ε=ε fmm && . Since money supply is endogenous in 
the inflation-targeting framework, (6’)-(7’) imply in the long run that money growth rate will 
be equal to current and expected inflation rates, i.e., eπ=π=μ  and feff π=π=μ .  
 5
 
2. Alternative monetary policy regimes 
In the inflation-targeting literature, the main rationale for adopting explicit inflation 
targets is to enhance credibility of monetary policy. The central bank uses the repo interest 
rate as instrument in order to achieve the inflation target. It is generally argued that, at least in 
a transition period until credibility is fully obtained, monetary policy must give higher priority 
to achieving the inflation target than is the case with a discretionary policy. As the dynamics 
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is generally not modelled, the inflation-
targeting regime is interpreted as like the central bank targets inflation at a horizon where 
most of the intermediate dynamics has taken place. 
The focus of this paper is the dynamics of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Two alternatives monetary regimes are considered to close the model: independent inflation 
targeting or monetary union targeting inflation. Under these two regimes, only flexible 
inflation targeting is examined3. In fact, the strict inflation-targeting regime can be considered 
as a limit case where the central bank attributes a very weak weight to its output target. The 
advantage of this approach is that it permits the study of the dynamics of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and the limit to the priority that the central bank can place on 
inflation target. In the present dynamic setting, a special role, other than determining passively 
the money supply growth rate, is given to monetary markets and money growth rates. The 
latter play the role of indicators.  
 
2.1 Independent inflation targeting 
Before forming a monetary union, home and foreign countries target inflation 
independently. The independent inflation-targeting regime, where home and foreign countries 
                                                 
3 Roisland and Torvik (2003) follow the approach of strict inflation targeting regime used by Persson and 
Tabellini (1996), Frankel and Chinn (1995). They consider also shortly the flexible inflation targeting regime.  
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target their respective inflation rate (π  and fπ ) and output ( y  and fy ), can thus be specified 
as Central Banks minimise the present discounted value of the following loss functions4: 
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where preference parameters λ  and κ  denote respectively the weight that monetary 
authorities place on the output and on the inflation stabilisation, and θ  is the discount factor. 
The home and foreign Central Banks minimise fluctuations of output around the potential 
output (respectively ∗y  and ∗fy ) and that of inflation around the inflation target (respectively 
Tπ and fTπ ), in using the nominal interest rates as the instrument of monetary policy. 
However, the direct instrument of the central bank is the repo interest rate. By manipulating 
the repo interest rate, the central bank is not always able to control the interest rates on the 
money and financial markets at which the private agents lend and borrow. To attain its target 
interest rate, the central bank may intervene in a discretionary manner on the money market in 
order to bring the market interest rates as close as possible to the optimal target interest rate 
defined in the following. The solution of central banks’ optimisation programmes leads to 
(Appendix A.1): 
    ⎭⎬
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Te ysi )(1 ,                                              (12) 
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d
ffTffef ysi )(1  .                                  (13) 
Equations (12)-(13) represent the central banks’ optimal interest rate rules. The nominal 
interest rate in each country increases to fully reflect expected inflation. It increases also 
whenever output (due to a positive demand shock) or current inflation rises above the central 
                                                 
4 For the sake of simplicity, CPIs and GDP deflators are not distinguished here. 
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bank’s target. Home (foreign) interest rate reacts positively (respectively negatively) to the 
real exchange rate. The reaction of nominal interest rate to current inflation, contrarily to the 
case of other variables, depends on the ratio λκ / . When this ratio increases, it means that the 
central bank will give more weight for the achievement of inflation target. The presence of 
the real exchange rate (s) in the these rules makes it possible for the central bank to react 
indirectly to shocks affecting the financial markets which integrate information in the 
exchange rate through the purchase and sale of home and foreign assets.  
When shocks are stochastic and temporary, the expected inflation rates can be estimated 
ex ante to be equal to the inflation targets of the central banks, i.e. Te ππ =  and fTfe π=π . 
However, if shocks are persistent or permanent, the private agents will not continue to believe 
in the announced targets. In contrast, private agents will take account, ex post, of these shocks 
as well as the economic conditions to modify rationally their inflation expectations. In effect, 
the liquidity in the economy is not always well regulated by market participants themselves 
and the central bank may intervene in an imperfect manner. That implies the inflation may 
have greater probability of deviating from the inflation target announced by the central bank. 
Consequently, the information from the money and financial markets is very useful for 
formation of inflation expectations by the private agents. 
The long-run equilibrium ( μ=π=π e , ffef μ=π=π , fe π+=π & , ),,,, siiyy ff  is 
characterised as follows (Appendix B.1):  
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The interest rate rules formulated in (12)-(13) permit inflation rate and output in each 
country to be only sensible to national supply shocks5. Nominal interest rate reacts more 
strongly to national supply shocks than that from other country, but equally to demand shocks 
in each country due to the transmission channel of real exchange rate. The home (foreign) 
supply and demand shocks have negative (respectively positive) effect on the real exchange 
rate, i.e. improvement (respectively deterioration) of terms of exchange. As s is stationary at 
equilibrium, the nominal exchange rate can evolve in time at a constant rate, e& . The latter is 
determined by the gap between home and foreign inflation targets, the supply shocks in each 
country and the exchange rate risk premium shock. The effect of supply shocks on the rate of 
change of nominal exchange rate ( e& ) depends on the slope of Phillips curve and the central 
banks’ preferences relative to inflation and output targets. The less the central banks cares 
about output targets (smaller ratio κλ / ), the less the supply shocks have effect on e& .  
 
2.2 Inflation targeting in monetary union 
In a monetary union, home and foreign countries have a common currency and monetary 
policy. The central bank targets the average inflation rate of the union. The monetary policy 
regime is specified as the minimisation of the following loss function:  
                                                 
5 In Roisland and Torvik (2003), output in each country is affected by a weighted average of home and foreign 
supply shocks under the strict inflation targeting regime. The difference with the present result is due to two 
facts. First, they assume that the expected inflation rates are given and equal to the inflation targets. Second, in 
assuming that the central banks realise their CPI targets, they do not allow the nominal interest rate to 
compensate the exchange rate effect on the aggregate demands in each country.  
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with 2/)( ** fU yyy +=∗ , 2/)( fU π+π=π . UTπ can be equal to 2/)( fTT π+π  or to other 
value chosen by the central bank. The solution of (21) leads to (Appendix A.2)  
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As the central bank stabilises the union’s average inflation rate and output, the real exchange 
rate does not play any role in the interest rate rule. In fact, its contradictory effects on the 
average inflation rate and output are neutralised since the two countries are of same size. A 
reaction to it does not permit to control the average inflation rate and output of the union.  
The solution of long-term equilibrium (where 0=π−π= fs& , eπ=π fef π=π=  
UUeU μ=π=π= ) is (Appendix B.2):  
α
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In comparing (14) and (23), the inflation-targeting union does not do better than 
independently inflation-targeting national central bank in stabilizing output. This is due to the 
fact that the expected inflation rates adjust fully to any shock after its realisation6. In 
examining (15) and (24), one finds that the difference between the two monetary policy 
                                                 
6 The result here is quite different from the result of Roisland and Torvik (2003). In fact, it is assumed here that 
the expected inflation rates adjust after the (persistent) shocks are realized, so that the output in each country will 
not be influenced by inflationary (or supply shock) at national level.  
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regimes is only reflected in the level and variance of inflation rates. In the union, as the 
nominal exchange rate disappears and the nominal interest rate is unique, the equalisation of 
real return of financial assets (bonds, equities etc.) means that the inflation rates of the 
member countries can not be different in the long run. It is easy then to analyse the welfare 
effect of the alternative monetary regimes in using central banks’ loss functions. As outputs 
depend only on internal supply shocks in each country, the analysis can be done in comparing 
only the variances of inflation rates. Using (15) and (24), one has:  
 ]),cov(2[)
2
  ()var( 2222
ffU
ππππ σ+εε+σκα
λ=π ,              (28)
 222 )()var( πσκα
λ=π ,      and     222 )()var( ff πσκα
λ=π .                 (29) 
In the union, the inflation rate depends on the sum of inflationary (or supply) shocks. If 
the inflationary shocks in the two countries are of the same value ( 22 fππ σ=σ ) and 
asymmetrical (i.e. with opposite signs or negatively correlated), the variance of union’s 
inflation rate (and so the variance of the inflation rates in each country of the union) will be 
less important than under independent inflation-targeting regime. The advantage of the union 
will not be clear-cut when the supply shocks have always the same sign (positively 
correlated) but different in value, the country having smaller shocks has less interest to join a 
monetary union. The home and foreign countries will join simultaneously the union only if 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
 0]3),cov(2[)
2
  ()var()var( 2222 <σ−σ+εεκα
λ=π−π ππππ ffU ,           (30)
 0]3),cov(2[)
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The nominal interest rate in the union will have a smaller variance7 than under the 
independent inflation-targeting regime when the supply shocks in home and foreign countries 
have the same variance but negative covariance. It follows from (15), (17)-(18), (24) and (26): 
),cov()
2
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2
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ffU ii ππππ εεβκα
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In contrast, the real interest rates have always the same variance under these two regimes. 
Monetary union has another advantage. As the nominal exchange rate disappears, the risk 
premium shocks affecting the foreign exchange market will not influence any more the firms’ 
import and export decisions and their international asset allocations. These gains are not 
reflected in the loss functions of the central banks.  
The conventional wisdom regarding shocks and OCA can be summarised by saying that 
the more asymmetrical shocks countries face, the less of an optimum currency area they 
constitute. For Roisland and Torvik (2003), with inflation targeting, this conventional wisdom 
holds for demand shocks, but not for supply shocks. In the present model, the results of 
Roisland and Torvik concerning supply shocks are confirmed. The more asymmetrical are the 
supply shocks, the more interesting is the participation to a monetary union. In contrast, in 
this simple model where the expected inflation rates adjusted after the realisation of shocks, 
the demand shocks do not play any role in the decisions to form a union or not.  
 
3. Stability analysis under alternative regimes 
 
In the following, the intermediate dynamics under alternative inflation-targeting regimes 
will be studied. For Roisland and Torvik (2003), by assumption, the stationary equilibrium is 
always realisable and the economy will converge to it.  
                                                 
7 A smaller variance of nominal interest rate may reduce risk premium incorporated in long term interest rate 
(not considered in this simple model) and stimulate capital investment in the long run. 
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The question is that, if this is the case, the inflation targeting will be a miracle receipt for 
all these countries suffering from chronic macro-economic instability. This might not be the 
case. It is important and interesting to discuss how the economy behaves dynamically when 
the inflation-targeting framework is adopted, and in particular, how the expected inflation 
rates adjust following the realisation of shocks.  
The adjustment of expected inflation rates is justifiable when the stochastic shocks have 
persistent effects once realised and known with certainty. In this case, it is not reasonable to 
assume that private agents believe in central bank’s inflation target and continue to take it as 
their expectation when all evidence indicates that the realised inflation rate is and will be 
higher or lower than the official target. As the money growth rates are endogenous, once 
announced by the central banks, they can be used as indicator by private agents in adjusting 
their expected inflation rates.  
In fact, central banks decide in their open market operations not only the nominal interest 
rates but also the amounts of liquidity allocated to commercial banks. The private agents take 
simply the announced money growth rates as given and equalised to their expected ones. The 
use of the endogenous money growth rates as indicators leads to endogenous dynamic 
adjustments of expected inflation rates8. In addition to the role of endogenous determination 
of monetary growth rates, monetary markets are useful places in co-ordinating the inflation 
expectations of private agents, expressed through their buying and selling of financial assets.9  
 
3.1. Independent flexible inflation targeting 
The variation of differential equations of s& , eπ&  and feπ& around the steady state gives 
(Appendix C): 
                                                 
8 This is the assumption adopted by Dai and Sidiropoulos (2003).  
9 That’s the only role attributed to the money market since Taylor (1993) in the inflation targeting literature.  
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There are two stables eigenvalues ( Ω−==
1
21 EE ) under the condition 0>Ω , i.e. 
2
2
1
α
β<λ
κ
l
l , and one unstable eignevalue β
γ= 23E . That is the case when the central banks do 
not attach too strong weight to their inflation targets and are interested quite much in 
stabilising output. As the expected inflation rates are variables that adjust more slowly10, they 
can be considered as predetermined variables. That means that they do not react immediately 
but later to news. The flexible nominal exchange rate and so the real exchange rate plays the 
role of non-predetermined variable. In fact, the transactions on the exchange market are much 
faster than on the goods markets and hence the adjustment of nominal exchange rate is not 
subjected to menu costs as in the case of many goods. With two stable eigenvalues and two 
predetermined variables, the system is characterised by saddle-point equilibrium. There is 
only one stable converging path to the steady state under the condition that central banks of 
two countries attribute a reasonable weight to their output target. If central banks give too 
much attention to inflation rates, the economy may not be stable and can take any path from 
the equilibrium after any small shock changing temporarily or permanently the steady state of 
the economy. In this case, there is more risk to see the appearance of hyperinflation, hyper-
deflation or other disequilibrium situations.  
                                                 
10 In the present model, the expected inflation rate in the Phillips curve is formed before the arrival of shocks. 
The empirical studies (Gordon, 1997) show an inertia of the adjustment of inflation rate. In assuming the 
expected inflation rate as a predetermined variable, reacting to economic news slowly without jumps, one 
admits that the prices adjust with lags due to menu costs or other rigidities. In this paper, output and realised 
inflation rates can jumps initially to share the adjustment due to an inflationary shock or the jumps of interest 
rates or nominal exchange rate. See also Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) for a similar assumption concerning 
inflation rate. This behaviour corresponds well to the situation in a low inflation period in contrast to high 
inflation or hyperinflation experiences.  
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3.2. Monetary union 
In taking its variation around the steady state, the dynamic system can be written as 
(Appendix D): 
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The system has two stable eigenvalues and one unstable eigenvalue:  
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If one admits like previously that the expected inflation rates are predetermined variables 
and the real exchange rate a non-predetermined variable, the economy has saddle-point 
equilibrium with a unique converging path. The necessary condition guaranteeing the 
existence of this path is the same as under the independent inflation-targeting regime where 
the central banks must moderate their preference for the stabilisation of inflation relative to 
that of output.  
In the monetary union regime, the introduction of a unique currency does not confer to 
the central bank the power to attribute a stronger relative weight in favour of inflation target 
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than national central banks, even though the member countries may be characterised by 
asymmetrical shocks. The central bank of the union being less conservative is then beneficial 
for the macro-economic stability of the union. This result seems uncomfortable for the 
position taken by the European central bank since it focuses excessively on its inflation target.  
Nevertheless, the stability conditions in a monetary union may be questioned on the basis 
of the asymmetry of shocks and the assumption about the adjustment speed of the real 
exchange rate.  
Firstly, when the shocks are asymmetrical, the economy of member countries may goes in 
different directions as the nominal interest rate of the union reacts to the average level of 
inflation in the union. If the central bank of the union has the same preferences than national 
central banks, the reaction of the nominal interest rate of the union will be smaller than that of 
individual country at origin of shocks under independent inflation targeting. Insufficient 
reaction means then a too low or too high real interest rate in one country and inversely in 
another. There is a risk that the economy of a member country enters into an unsustainable 
boom or a prolonged depression with the other country in an opposite situation.  
Secondly, for the real exchange rate, the story in the monetary union is quite different 
from that under floating exchange rate regime, where the quick adjustment of the nominal 
exchange rate guarantees that of the real exchange rate. In a monetary union, as the foreign 
exchange market disappears, the adjustment of the real exchange rate is subjected to the same 
constraints as other goods prices; since its adjustment is resulting form that of nominal goods 
prices. If the adjustment of goods prices is submitted to menu costs and other rigidities, it is 
more reasonable to assume the real exchange rate as a predetermined variable. So with two 
stable roots and three predetermined variables, the economy of the union might not find a 
converging path to the stationary equilibrium. One may relative this scepticism in arguing that 
the nominal prices of tradable goods are more flexible than that of non-tradable goods. Then, 
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if one redefines the real exchange rate as the relative price of tradable goods, it can be thought 
as a quite flexible and non-predetermined.  
 
4. Dynamic adjustments after supply and demand shocks 
 
Two kinds of shocks, i.e. the supply and demand shocks, are considered. The shocks 
affecting money and foreign exchange markets are not examined, as they do not change the 
real variables and the inflation rates.  
 
4.1. Independent flexible inflation targeting 
The general solution of the dynamic system (34) is written as follows:  
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where ,3,2,1, =iVij  are eigenvectors which corresponds to eigenvalues jE , 3,2,1=j . They are 
obtained using the following system:  
0
/2 )(/)(/
0 /10
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.             (38)  
The coefficients ki  in (37) can be determined given the initial conditions at the instant 
0=t , namely )0(eπ and )0(feπ . As 03 >E , the dynamic adjustment along the unique 
convergent path will be described by (39) while imposing the restriction 03 =k . Thus, eπ  and 
feπ  being predetermined by the previous evolution of the economy, s  adjusts instantaneously 
and reaches the value )0( +s  that ensures 03 =k  at 0=t . As eek π−π= )0(1 , fefek π−π= )0(2 , 
the solution of (37) can be rewritten as 
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Knowing that 21 EE = , the instantaneous adjustment of s  at 0=t  will satisfy the 
following relation:  
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For other variables, using (39), (A9)-(A.12), (6’)-(7’) and (12)-(13), it yields:  
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An inflationary (or adverse supply) shock in the home country will in the long term 
increase the realised and expected inflation rates, reduce the output and the competitiveness in 
the home country. In the foreign country, only nominal and real interest rates react in order to 
neutralise the effects of the gain in its competitiveness. The real exchange rate jumps down 
initially to place the economy on the converging path and pursues its decrease until the steady 
state. The expected inflation rate adjusts smoothly, without any jump, to a higher level. Other 
variables (except the foreign output and inflation rates which will not adjust) follow increasing 
or decreasing path according to the case with an initial jump-up or jump-down11 (Figure 1). 
The direction of initial movement of μ  depends on the relative importance of three factors, 
i.e., the initial adjustments of inflation rate, output and interest rate according to equation (6’). 
As a consequence, the money growth rate in home country can initially jump up, contrary to 
what is illustrated in the Figure 1, where it jumps down.  
A positive demand shock in home country has no long term effect on inflation rates and 
output levels, so the adjustment is entirely operated through the jumps of the nominal and real 
exchange rates as well as that of home and foreign nominal interest rates. The dynamic paths 
of other variables are stationary. 
                                                 
11 Using (14)-(15) and (A.9)-(A.10) into (41)-(42), one has πεκα+λ
λ+π=π−πκα+λ
λ=π 220 )( Tee  
and π
∗
ππ
∗ εκα+λ
ακ−=εκα
λ
κα+λ
ακ+κα+λκα
εκα+λακ−= 22222
2
0 )(
)(
yyy , home country’s current 
inflation and output share the initial adjustment due to the supply shock by a jump-up and a jump-down 
respectively. From (43) and (44), foreign country’s output and inflation rate will not be influenced by the home 
country supply shocks. The paths of home and foreign money supply growth rates and interest rates can be 
determined using (45)-(48) and (6’)-(7’), (12)-(13) and (15).  
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Figure 1. Adjustment paths of endogenous variables after a persistent adverse supply shock 
 in the independent inflation-targeting regime. 
 
4.2. Monetary union 
The dynamic system of the monetary union is solved as follows: 
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where 0
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U . In setting 0=t  and 
taking the expected inflation rates as predetermined variables, one obtains from (49) 
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Using (49), (6’)-(7’), (22) and (A.19)-(A.22), it leads to the following dynamic paths for 
other variables: 
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Consider as before the case of an adverse supply shock in the home country. It will in the 
long term increase the realised and expected inflation rates in the union, reduce the output and 
the competitiveness in the home country. It has no effect on the output of the foreign country. 
As the union’s nominal interest rate reacts to the home country’s shock, this reaction is too 
weak to absorb the shock for the home country and too high for the foreign country that is not 
at the origin of the shock. The initial reaction of the real exchange rate (assumed to be 
flexible) is not clear in this situation. It depends on the sign of 12 1 −γl  according to (49).  
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If 012 1 >−γl , there will be an initial under-adjustment. In the contrary, there will be an 
over-adjustment (the case represented in Figure 2). Given that, output in foreign country reacts 
in the short and intermediate terms to home country’s supply shock. The adjustment of 
different variables is influenced by the initial over- or under-adjustment of real exchange rate. 
The exact nature of their initial adjustment depends on the value of different parameters. After 
the initial jumps (except the expected inflation rates), the endogenous variables follow an 
increasing or decreasing paths according to the case. It is assumed, in Figure 2, that the 
positive effects dominate the negative ones, so the money growth rates in the two countries 
increase initially. 
As under the independent inflation-targeting regime, a positive demand shock in the home 
country has no long-term effect on inflation rates and outputs, the adjustment is entirely 
operated through the initial jumps of the real exchange rate, and nominal and real interest 
rates. The dynamic paths of expected and realised inflation rates and outputs as well as money 
growth rates in the member countries are stationary.  
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                Figure 2. Adjustment paths of endogenous variables after a persistent adverse  
supply shock in the inflation-targeting monetary union. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Considering that the money supply is not perfectly regulated neither by the market 
participants to the money market nor by the central bank, this paper examine the implication 
of this hypothesis for inflation expectations dynamics in setting of economic union where 
member countries can adopt individually the inflation-targeting regime or abandon their 
national currency to the profit of unique currency with a common monetary policy conducted 
by a common inflation-targeting central bank.  
This paper compares, in a dynamic setting, the independent inflation-targeting regime and 
a monetary union targeting inflation. Four main conclusions come out. Firstly, when the 
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expected inflation rates of private agents are fully adjusted through the co-ordination of the 
monetary markets, only supply shocks influence the equilibrium inflation and output levels. 
Secondly, central banks’ preferences for inflation and output stabilisations must be limited 
under these two alternative regimes. When central banks attribute a too strong weight for the 
inflation stabilisation relative to the output stabilisation, inflation and output may go out of 
control. Unsustainable boom and deflation become possible scenarios. Thirdly, contrary to the 
traditional OCA literature, demand shocks have not any influence on the decision of a country 
to join a monetary union. Only asymmetrical supply shocks can justify this choice. Finally, 
the central bank of the union, facing asymmetrical shocks, has difficulty to control the 
inflation rates in each country as it reacts to the average inflation rate. The nominal interest 
rate of the union may be too low for the country that is at the origin of the inflationary and 
demand shocks but too high for the other country.  
The difficulty in guaranteeing the macro-economic stability becomes particularly critical 
with the disappearance of the floating foreign exchange market between the currencies of the 
countries forming the union. The real exchange rate may not adjust as quickly as when the 
foreign exchange market exists. The rigidities in the adjustments of expected inflation rates 
and real exchange rate might imply that a disparate union is more subject to risky adjustment 
paths conducting to undesirable situations.  
 
Appendix A. Derivation of the optimal monetary policy rule 
A.1. Independent inflation-targeting regime 
The first-order conditions of central banks’ minimisation problems (12)-(13) are: 
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Using equations (3)-(4) and the partial derivatives, απ
1=∂
∂y , α=π∂
∂ 1
f
fy , obtained from 
equations (1)-(2), it leads to  
0)(] )([ =π−πκ+ε+−γ+π−β−α
λ ∗ T
d
e ysi .                      (A.3) 
0)(] )([ =π−πκ+ε+−γ−π−β−α
λ ∗ fTff
d
ffef ysi .           (A.4) 
Equations (A.3)-(A.4) give the following central banks’ optimal monetary policy rules: 
])( [1 d
Te ysi ε+−π−πλ
κα+γβ+π=
∗ ,             (A.5) 
])( [1 fd
ffTffef ysi ε+−π−πλ
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∗  .             (A.6) 
Substituting the expected real interest rates drawn from (A.5) and (A.6) respectively in 
equations (3) and (4), one has:  
 )(* Tyy π−πλ
κα−= .              (A 7)  
)(* fTfff yy π−πλ
κα−= .              (A.8)  
Combining equations (1)-(2) with (A.7)-(A.8) respectively, one has:  
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A.2. Monetary union with inflation-targeting central bank 
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As home and foreign countries are assumed to have the same size, the average inflation 
rate of union is 
2
f
U π+π=π , the average output 
2
f
U yyy += , the average expected inflation 
rate 
2
fee
Ue π+π=π . The nominal interest rate is the same for the two countries, i.e. Uei . 
Dividing by two the sum of equations (1) and (2) and that of equations (3) and (4) yields the 
average Phillips curve and aggregate demand in the union:   
2
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The minimisation of the loss of the union’s central bank, (21), gives: 
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From (A.13), one has: α=π∂∂ /1/ UUy . Inserting this result and (A.14) into (A .15) yields 
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That gives the optimal nominal interest rate rule of the central bank in the union: 
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Using the fact fU iii == and equations (1)-(4) and (22), fy ππ ,, and fy can be solved in 
terms of dynamic variables ( π,s  and fπ ), exogenous variables and shocks through the 
following system: 
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with the determinant of the matrix given by  det
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From (A.19) and (A.21), it is easy to obtain:  
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Appendix B.  The solutions of long-run equilibrium 
B.1. Independent inflation targeting with floating exchange rate 
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In the long term, one has: μ=π=π e , ffef μ=π=π , 0=π−+π= es f && , fe π+=π & , 
 eii f &+= , ffii π−=π− . From equations (1) and (2), it results: 
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To solve the other variables, one can rewrite (3)-(4) and (12)-(13) using (B.1)-(B.) as follows: 
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Using the equalities fe π+=π & , ffii π−=π− and eii f &+= , one obtains also: 
)( α
ε−α
ε
κα
λ+π−π=π−π= ππ
f
fTTfe& ,      (B.11) 
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)
22
 )
2
()
2
2(
2
)(
22 β
ε+β
ε+εβκα
κα+εβκα
βλ+κα+β
+−π= ππ
∗∗ f
ddf
f
fTf yyi . (B.12) 
B.2. Monetary union with inflation targeting 
In the long run, one has: UUeUfefe μ=π=π=π=π=π=π , 0=π−π= fs& . As 
before, from equations (1) and (2), it results: 
α
ε−= π∗yy ,       (B.13) 
α
ε−= π∗
f
ff yy  .         (B.14) 
Using (B.14)-(B.15), equations (3)-(4) and (22) can be rewritten in the long term as  
d
UTU
Uf
dd syy ε+γ+π−πλβ
ακ+β−β
ε+εβ−=α
ε−
∗π∗        ])(
 
 
  2
    
[ , (B.15) 
        ])(
 
 
  2
    
[ fd
UTU
Uf
dd
f
f syy ε+γ−π−πλβ
ακ+β−β
ε+εβ−=α
ε−
∗π∗ ,    (B.16) 
  )(
 
 
  2
    UTUU
f
ddUU yi π−πλβ
ακ+β−β
ε+ε+π=
∗
.    (B.17) 
Solving (B.15)- (B.17) gives the solutions for sU ,π and i : 
)(
2
  
2
fUTUUefefeU
ππ ε+εκα
λ+π=μ=π=π=π=π=π=π ,  (B.18) 
)(
2
 1 
α
ε−α
ε+ε−ε+−γ=
ππ∗∗
f
d
f
d
fyys      (B.19) 
  2
    
 ))(
2
  1
2
  
(
2 β−β
ε+ε+ε+εαβ+κα
λ+π=
∗
ππ
Uf
ddfUTU yi  .  (B.20) 
Appendix C. Differential equations of expected inflation rates and real exchange rate 
under independent inflation-targeting 
C.1. The differential equations for expected inflation rates ( eπ& and feπ& ) 
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Consider first the case of home country. Given π , y&  and i&, equation (6’) can be used to 
determine the money growth rate, with ilyl && 21 −+= πμ . It permits also the private agents to 
reformulate their inflation expectations as the expected money growth rate satisfies:  
 eeee ilyl && 21 −+= πμ .      (C.1)  
The equations (6’) and (C.1) imply that at the stationary state μππ ==e . Knowing that, 
at every moment, information on μ  is available through the announcement of the central 
bank, the private agents adjust simply their expectations of μ  to the announced rate so that 
μμ =e  and thus:  
 eee ilyl && 21 +−= μπ .        (C.2) 
Equation (C.2) implies that the private agents can use, while adjusting their inflation 
expectations, the whole information concerning the conditions of supply and demand on the 
goods market as well as on the financial and monetary markets. Combining (6’) and (C.2) in 
eliminating μ , it yields:  
eee ilylilyl &&&& 2121 +−−+= ππ .      (C.3) 
In admitting 0=dε& , 0=πε&  (i.e. shocks without tendency), equation (1) can be derived to 
time to give )(1 ey ππα &&& −=  and 0)(
1 =−= eeey ππα &&& . In deriving (12) to time, one obtains 
esi ππλ
καγβ &&&& ++= )(
1  and eeee si ππλ
καγβ &&&& ++= )(
1 . Using (A.9), one has eπκαλ
λπ && 2+= . 
In using these results and the assumption ess && = , equation (C.3) can be rewritten as:  
)()()( 2
2
2
1
2
2
eeeeTee ll ππκαλ
λ
λ
κα
βππκαλ
λ
απλ
καεπκαλ
λπ π &&&& −+−−+++++= ,   (C.4) 
or more simply:  
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)(1
2
2
Tee πλ
καεκα
λππ π +Ω+Ω−=& , with λ
κα
βα
21 ll −=Ω .               (C.5) 
Taking the variation of (C.5) around the long-run equilibrium, one has: 
  )(1 eee πππ −Ω−=& .         (C.6) 
Using (2), (4), (7’) and (13) similarly leads to: 
)(1 fefefe π−πΩ−=π& .                (C.7) 
C.2. The differential equation for real exchange rate ( s& ) 
Equations (5) and (2) can be rewritten as  
        e
feefe iis ε−π+π−=  - & ,        (C.8) 
As the foreign exchange market adjusts quickly, it is assumed simply ess && = . Taking the 
variation of (C.8) around the steady state leads to:         
)()()( eeef
e
fff
e iiiiss π−π−π−π+−−−== && .    (C.9) 
Using then the optimal interest rate rules (12)-(13), one has: 
)()( π−πλβ
κα+−β
γ+π−π=− ssii ee ,      (C.10) 
)()( fffefeff ssii π−πλβ
κα+−β
γ−π−π=− .      (C.11) 
From (A.9) and (A.11), one has: 
 )(2
ee π−πκα+λ
λ=π−π ,       (C.12) 
)(2
fefeff π−πκα+λ
λ=π−π .         (C.13) 
Inserting (C.10)-(C.13) into (C.9) gives the following dynamic equation:  
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(2
22
fefeeesss π−πκα+λβ
κα−π−πκα+λβ
κα+−β
γ=& .  (C.14) 
 31
Equations (C.6), (C.7) and  (C.14) can be rewritten in matrix form as in the system (34).   
 
Appendix D. Differential equations of expected inflation rates and real exchange rate in 
inflation-targeting monetary union  
D.1 The differential equations for expected inflation rates  ( fee ππ && , ) 
It is assumed that national money and financial markets are not fully integrated at the 
union’s level, so that the private agents of each country take account of their national real 
interest rate (instead of union’s real interest rate) to decide their consumption and investment. 
As under independent inflation-targeting, the national monetary markets give information for 
private agents to form their expectations of national inflation rate.  
Examine first the expected inflation rate for the home country. Substituting i& and fi&  by 
Ui& , ei&  and  fei&  by Uei&  respectively in equations (6’)-(7’), and using the same procedure as in 
Appendix C give:  
UeeUe ilylilyl &&&& 2121 +−−+π=π .                             (D.1) 
UefeUfffe ilylilyl &&&& 2121 +−−+π=π .                           (D.2) 
At the steady state, one has UUUefffee μ=π=π=μ=π=π=μ=π=π . The sum and the 
difference of (D.1) and (D.2) give respectively:  
UeUfeefffee ililyylyyl &&&&&& 2211 22)()( +−+−++π+π=π+π ,            (D.3) 
)()( 11
feefffee yylyyl &&&& −−−+π+π=π−π .              (D.4) 
In inserting )(1 ey π−πα= &&&  and 0)(
1 =−= eeey ππα &&&  derived from equation (1), 
)(1 feffy π−πα= &&& and 0)(
1 =π−πα=
fefefey &&&  from equation (2), UUeUi πλβ
ακ+π= &&&
 
  and 
UeUeUei πλβ
ακ+π= &&&
 
  from equation (22), 
2
f
U π+π=π &&&  and 
2
fee
Ue π+π=π &&&  (by definition), 
 32
) (
 
 
2
feef π+πλ+κα
λ=π+π &&  from (A.23), sfeef &&&&&   2  ))(1( αγ+π−παβ+=π−π  from  (A.24), 
as well as (A.23) and (A.24) into (D.3)-(D.4) leads to 
)  (
) (2 
 
2
)(
 2 2321
2
2
21
2
21
fUT
feefee
llllll ππ
ε+εκα−ακλβ
βλ+πκα−λβ
αλβ+π+πκα−λβ
αλβ−=π+π && ,   (D.5) 
)]()()  ([ 
2
1     )(
22 111
f
dd
fffee
fee
yy
l
ss
ll
ε−ε−ε−ε−−αβ+β
γ−β
αγ−π−πα−=π−π ππ∗∗&
&&
.  (D.6) 
The average inflation rate follows an autonomous dynamic path independent of the real 
exchange rate. The stability condition is 0 221 >κα−λβ ll , or otherwise 2
2
1
α
β<λ
κ
l
l . That’s the 
same as under independent inflation-targeting regime.  
In the monetary union, the real exchange rate will evolve respecting: 
0=π+π−=+−= ff sppse &&&&& . Using (A.24), that leads to 
.      2))((1 fdd
ffeef ss αε+αε−ε−ε+γα−π−παβ+−=π−π= ππ&               (D.7) 
From (D.5)-(D.6), it is easy to obtain: 
),(
2
1)  (
 ) (2
       
)(
2   
)  ( 
2
       
      )
   
(
2
1)
   
(
2
1
1
23
21
2
1
2
211
11
2
211
2
21
ff
f
dd
UTf
feee
lll
lll
yy
l
ss
lllllll
ππππ
∗∗
ε−εβ−ε+εκα−ακλβ
βλ+
ε−εβ
α−πκα−λβ
αλβ+−β
α+
β
γ−β
αγ−πα−κα−λβ
λβα−πα−κα−λβ
λαβ=π &&
              (D.8) 
).(
2
1)  (
  ) (2
         
)(
2   
)  ( 
2
         
      )
    
(
2
1)
   
(
2
1
1
23
21
2
1
2
211
11
2
211
2
21
ff
f
dd
UTf
feefe
lll
lll
yy
l
ss
lllllll
ππππ
∗∗
ε−εβ+ε+εκα−ακλβ
βλ+
ε−εβ
α+πκα−λβ
αλβ+−β
α−
β
γ+β
αγ+πα+κα−λβ
λαβ−πα+κα−λβ
λαβ−=π &&
           (D.9) 
The system (D.7)-(D .9) can be rewritten in matrix form as follows: 
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.
  
)(
2
1)  (
) (2
 )(
2   
)  ( 
2
)(
2
1)  (
) (2
 )(
2   
)  ( 
2
  2)(1)(1
  2  )(1 )
   
(
2
1)(1 ) 
   
(
2
1
  2   )(1 )
   
(
2
1)(1 )
   
(
2
1
1
23
21
2
1
2
211
1
23
21
2
1
2
211
2
11
2
211
2
21
2
11
2
211
2
21
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
αε+αε−ε−ε
ε−εβ+ε+εκα−ακλβ
βλ+ε−εβ
α+πκα−λβ
λαβ+−β
α−
ε−εβ−ε+εκα−ακλβ
βλ+ε−εβ
α−πκα−λβ
λαβ+−β
α+
+
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
π
π
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
γα−αβ+αβ+−
β
γα−β
αγ
β
αβ+γ+α−κα−λβ
λαβ−
β
αβ+γ−α+κα−λβ
λαβ−
β
γα+β
αγ−β
αβ+γ−α+κα−λβ
λαβ−
β
αβ+γ+α−κα−λβ
λαβ−
=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
π
π
ππ
ππππ
∗∗
ππππ
∗∗
f
dd
f
fff
dd
UTf
fff
dd
UTf
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e
fe
e
llllll
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l
llllll
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l
s
lllllll
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&
&
 
 
References: 
Ball, L. (1998). Policy Rules for Open Economies. In John B. Taylor (ed.), Monetary Policy 
Rules. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Batini, N. and Haldane A. G. (1999). Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy. In J.B. 
Taylor (ed.) (1999).  Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Benigno, P. (2004). Optimal monetary policy in a currency area. Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 63(2), pages 293-320. 
Benigno, P., López-Salido J. D. (2006). Inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy in 
the euro area”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Volume 38, Number 3, 587-614. 
Berger, H., H. Jensen and Schjelderup G. (2001). To Peg or Not to Peg? A Simple Model of 
Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Small Economies. Economics Letters, Vol. 73, Issue 2, 
161-167. 
Buiter W. H. and Panigirtzoglou N. (2003). Overcoming the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest 
Rates with Negative Interest on Currency: Gesell’s Solution. Economic Journal, 113, 723-
746. 
Canzoneri, M.B., Nolan C., and Yates A. (1997). Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary 
Stability: Inflation Targeting vs the ERM. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 29, 46-
60. 
Clarida, R., J. Gali and Gertler M. (2001). Optimal Monetary Policy in Open versus Closed 
Economies: An Integrated Approach. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 
91, 248–252. 
Dai, M. and Sidiropoulos M. (2003). Règle du taux d’intérêt optimale, prix des actions et taux 
d’inflation anticipé : une étude de la stabilité macroéconomique. Économie Appliquée, N° 
4, 115-140. 
Dueker, M., Fischer A. M. (1996). Inflation targeting in a small open economy: Empirical 
results for Switzerland. Journal of Monetary Economics, 37/1, 89-103.  
Frankel, J. A. and M. D. Chinn (1995). The Stabilizing Properties of a Nominal GNP Rule. 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 27, 318–334. 
Gali, J. and Monacelli T. (2005). Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small 
Open Economy. Review of Economic Studies 72, 707–734. 
Gordon, R. J. (1997). The Time Varying Nairu and its Implications for Economic Policy. 
Journal of Economic Perspective, 11/2, 11-32.  
King, R. G. (2000). The new IS-LM model: language, logic, and limits. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 86/3, 45-103.  
 34
Leitemo, K. and Roisland O. (2002). The Choice of Monetary Policy Regime for Small Open 
Economies. Annales de Economie et de Statistique, n° 67-68, 465-494. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini G. (1995). Doubled-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy 
Coordination. In Gene Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of International 
Economics, Vol III. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Rodseth, A. (1996). Exchange Rate Versus Price Level Targets and Output Stability. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98, 559–577. 
Roisland, O., Torvik R. (2003). Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting. Open 
Economies Review 14, 99–118. 
Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214. 
Svensson, L.E.O. (2000). Open Economy Inflation Targeting. Journal of International 
Economics 50, 155–183. 
